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# Trust in Administration and Citizens' Intent to Participate

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## 1. Introduction

The mass media has reported on scandals, injustices and other problems concerning administration, such as government-initiated bid-rigging and unlawful activities by government officials including malversation, driving without a license, municipal housing rent in arrears, profit-making activities within the sick leave system, exorbitant special allowances, fictitious overtime allowances and staff benefits. In addition, there have also been reports of problems related to the collapse of administration, such as an inadequate response to SARS, avian flu, etc., along with improper exemption and incomplete records for the national pension system, and the leaking of personal information. This is not the first time that such unlawful activities or malfunctions in administration have occurred. The National Public Service Ethics Law was enforced in 2000 based on the cozy relationship that existed between industries and the public sector, or between public and private sectors, in the 1990s. Moreover, the Ad Hoc Commission on Administrative Reform from the 1980s notes that trust in administration was a key word when referring to the period twenty years earlier (Kikuchi, 2006: 15). In addition, most cases of corruption among government officials had previously been committed by lower ranked governmental staff, local civil servants or special corporations in the 1980s. However, it is said that executives such as high-ranking officials and those who should be setting good examples, such as the Administrative Vice-Minister, started engaging in corruption in the 1990s (Inatsugu, 2006: 38-40). From these tendencies, we can see the background of corruption and unlawful activities. They are initiated in places where an organization with public power or authority exists and adopts secretive methods.

Such unlawful activities and administrative malfunction will eventually lead to an erosion of trust in the government<sup>1)</sup> or administration. Generally, in addition to the code of conduct for public officials or dedication to service, public officials must also be held accountable to citizens. However, it is never easy to regain public trust once lost; therefore fostering public trust in administration is an important subject for administrators to always bear in mind. It is

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<sup>1)</sup> Although the two words "government" and "administration" are used according to the terms for the trusted bodies treated in earlier studies, the term "government" is used as a concept meaning not only "administration" but also "legislation and judiciary".

considered that the secretive methods of administration and bureaucracy are at the root of the problem of trust in administration. Therefore, it follows that under a transparent management style, citizens will begin attempting to participate in policy making and take countermeasures against the unlawful activities and inadequacies of administration. The administration side usually supports citizens' participation, whether perfunctorily or substantially, in the process of formulating policy. Specifically, whether at national or local level, the idea of public participation is no longer new. Methods include: holding a deliberative council at the time of planning decisions; having publicly invited members participate in various committees; gauging the degree of residents' satisfaction by questionnaire; holding citizens' symposiums, inviting public comment and public involvement for the provision of social overhead capital; supplying information to people through a website setting evaluation terms for programs/projects to describing citizens' needs. It seems that these activities are backed by the idea that citizens' participation in administration will lead to trust in administration.

On the other hand, the question arises as to from what viewpoint we should consider the relationship of citizens' participation in administration to securing trust in administration? Generally, only a limited number of citizens participate in administration, and in fact, the overwhelming majority passively receives administrative services without any voice. Many 'silent citizens' who have not participated in administrative activities view them with distrust. This is the actual situation in Japan. In a country like this, discussion must first be focused on citizens' intent prior to participation activity. When administrative officials attempt to ensure administrative transparency by promoting citizens' participation, with the aiming of gaining their trust, it will be necessary to bring many 'silent citizens' into view in order to succeed. In this sense, participation intention becomes important as a premise of participation action, and many autonomous bodies set participation intention as an action item for city planning in questionnaires targeting citizens. In this paper, discussion is focused on the citizens' participation intention in administration, rather than the actual participation action itself. In addition, 'silent citizens' are all those citizens that have not expressed their opinions through participation activities, including those with no intention of participation. However, the citizens whom this paper focuses on are those who do not actually take part in administrative activities, nor voice their opinions, in spite of their intention to participate.

Since the "participation intention" itself is an idea taking "participation" as a premise, when considering the relation between intent to participate and trust, there is a need to acknowledge the point of argument concerning the "participation" itself and that trust. In the following discussion, I will examine empirical verification evidence about the relationship between trust in administration and the citizens' participation intention, based on earlier demonstrative studies. Firstly, however, I will examine the points that seem to be especially important in regard to "trust in administration and the citizens' participation."

## 2. Major Points for Debate Concerning Trust in Administration and Citizens' Participation

### 2.1. Trust on the System, Quality of Functions and Expectations

According to Luhmann, trust is interpreted as relying on the expectations of others and of society, and the will to gain additional information —through details about certain basic characteristics that have already been

obtained—in a situation where information is incomplete (Niklas Luhmann, 1990:57). Studies concerning trust cover a wide variety of academic fields, and have already been introduced in a number of publications and papers, so I would like to mention only one example here. For example, LaPorta et al. has revealed that a strong sense of trust leads to cooperative action using the theory of games including iterated prisoners' dilemma game, dictator game and ultimatum game (LaPorta et al. 1997: 333).

The social capital theory asserts that social capital which regards trust as one of its constituents improves the performance of the system and the economy. Putnam argued that general trust would be created from norms of reciprocity and a network of citizens' active participation (Robert Putnam, 2001: 212-220). According to studies which utilize Japanese data, the effect of social capital appears in trust in administration at the municipality level, while it is also pointed out that it may not be apparent in trust in administration at the national and prefectural level (Kobayashi, 2006:101). Alternatively, studies on the relationship between health and social capital formed by people's connections and trust have been conducted. It is noted that the probability that people have a poor subjective view of health drops in areas where social capital is abundant (Ichida, 2007:112).

Traditional politics has argued about trust in relation to democratic governments (Niikawa, 2006:9). Moreover, in business administration, the importance of trust is taken into consideration in situations where the relationship between companies and consumers, and the relationship among entities such as business-to-business transactions and collaboration, are detected. For example, discussions on the formation of a sound relationship by mutual cooperation through trust and commitment were conducted in the marketing of relationships (Shimaguchi, 1994: 198-199).

As mentioned, trust is referred to in a wide variety of fields, and areas of interest include a wide variety of aspects, including how to define trust, behavior of individuals and groups as well as the relationship among organizations based on trust, performance of trust, society and so on, and factors of trust. In considering trust and citizens' participation in administration, which this paper focuses on, it is useful to have knowledge of academic fields that have discussed trust targeting systems such as administration and the government. In that sense, knowledge of traditional politics and the social capital theory seem to be useful. However, how trust in individuals leads to trust in systems such as administration and politics has not been expressly considered by the social capital theory. In addition, it is pointed out that an anticipated underlying relationship may be incorrect, as there is no reciprocity on the reliability of the government and administration. This anticipated underlying relationship is the idea that those who have actively participated in society contact administrative officials and they show a cooperative attitude toward citizens. As a result, the citizens' trust in administrative officials reciprocally increases, which in turn leads to trust in administration in general (Ikeda, 2006:79). Although the social capital theory has referred to participation in society and politics, it has not fully paid attention to the relationship between their trust and citizens' participation in city planning led by administration.

In traditional politics discussing trust in system, according to Niikawa, trust has been argued in relation to democratic politics and democratic governments, and "strong trust" means a situation where both democratic control over the government, and a high level of governmental performance and efficiency, are achieved simultaneously (Niikawa, 2006:9). One of the reasons for growing distrust is malfunction of the government, and the countermeasures to this include restoration of elite democracy, restructuring of excessive functions owned by the government and improvement of public functions in the civil society sector. Another reason is increased distrust in the government

associated with the public's growing democratic understanding, and the countermeasures to this are strengthening of control over the government and improvement of the government's response (Niikawa, 2006: 10-12). With regards to the latter cause, it can be understood that the public begin to show an interest in governmental activities as their democratic understanding deepens, and they recognize failure and fraud by the government through this democratic thinking. Distrust in the government comes about mainly due to failure and fraud by the government. Conversely, if the quality of governmental function and administrative services is higher than the public's expectations, then trust in administration will grow based on democratic understanding.

According to an argument by Yamagishi, malfunction of the government causes a decrease in trustworthiness of the government which is a characteristic of the trusted side, while the public's growing democratic understanding is a premise of "trust" as a characteristic of the trusting side (Yamagishi, 1998: 48-50). The public's growing democratic understanding is particularly important in relation to citizens' participation in administration. In other words, participants, especially those who have an intent to participate, pay attention to whether they proactively "trust" administration in the course of fostering of citizens' participation in administration based on democratic thinking. Furthermore, when this democratic understanding concerns expectations on administration aiming at obtaining trustworthiness of administration, and the level of expectations is unreasonably high, administrative services may not gain an appropriate evaluation, even if the quality level of administrative services derived from the trustworthiness is appropriate. Needless to say, we can also expect the reverse relationship to exist, i.e. evaluation higher than capacity in the case that expectation level is unreasonably low.

On the other hand, malfunction—the cause leading to distrust— will eventually affect the quality of administrative services. However, it seems that the administrative malfunction and fraud which citizens learn about through the media are not always directly related to the quality of administrative services directly, but rather that much of it is related to internal management of administrative organizations. For example, there is bid-rigging related to orders of public works, malversation, special treatment for staff, and the leaking of personal information. However, citizens do not believe that administration with links to this kind of failure and fraud by internal management can function efficiently at the appropriate standard, namely administrative services. As mentioned, this leads to doubts about the trustworthiness of administration, and malfunction of administration will eventually affect the quality of administrative services. To reiterate, the quality of administrative services is evaluated in relation to expectations by citizens about administration with a democratic way of thinking.

Based on the points mentioned above, when arguing trust in the administration system, it is necessary to be based on the quality of administrative services as its functions and expectations.

## 2.2. Intent to Participate and Strong Trust

Luhmann divided the concept of trust into "personal trust<sup>2)</sup>" which arises as an expectation caused by the personality of others, and "system trust<sup>3)</sup>" which does not require internal assurance but is hard to control. This system trust is an expectation of the actions of a system. As images of administration are influenced by the response of the officials at the counter, personal trust cannot be entirely ignored when considering trust in administration. However, the focus is placed on system trust, although it is considered via means of personal trust. In considering trust in

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<sup>2)</sup> Niklas Luhmann (1990), p 70.

<sup>3)</sup> Niklas Luhmann (1990), p 92.

administration and citizens' participation, particular attention should be paid to system trust. What is important is that system trust is harder to control than personal trust when system trust itself decreases. Efforts for administrative evaluation have been actively made since the 1990's, when distrust in politics was focused on. According to Sunahara (2003), this is to gain system trust by evaluating the effectiveness of measures from outside of the organization. It can be said that research on the relationship between trust in administration and citizens' participation includes consideration on the possibility of control over administration. Thus, intent to participate is placed as a premise of the actual participative action.

Desirable control over administration does not always try to completely control its activities in their proceedings as an unreliable entity. Yamagishi claims that an attempt to ensure "security" obtained by thorough monitoring devices—with respect to unreliable entities—requires higher costs as a result of abandoning freedom, and that "trust"—which is distinguished from "security"—accepts uncertainty while it reduces opportunity cost and attempts to secure efficiency (Yamagishi, 1998: 194-197, 1999: 80-81). In other words, citizens' thorough participation causes inefficiency of administrative activities. However, administrative transparency is not secured without citizens' participation, resulting in growing distrust. In what context can we view this dilemma?

C.S. King, et al. (1998) divided citizens' participation into unauthentic participation and authentic participation. King claims that unauthentic participation is the one required after an agenda has been set up and decided, while authentic participation is to be required at an earlier stage before things are set up. Unauthentic participation takes a combatively interactive style under distrust, while authentic participation uses a cooperative interaction based on trust. Authentic participation functions only when citizens have trust in administration, and when administration gains the trust to the citizens. Decision-making may seem to take less time and things proceed smoothly with unauthentic participation, but recall and review often occur due to resistance from citizens. On the other hand, with authentic participation, although it might appear that time required for decision-making is longer and its progress is complicated, it is pointed out that, generally, the time required for review based on citizens' involvement may in fact be shorter than the traditional decision-making process (C.S. King, et al., 1998:321). That is, it is impossible to leave the process of administrative activities covered up in front of citizens who have a raised democratic awareness. It is easier to ensure efficiency of administrative activities by fostering authentic participation—where more than just unauthentic participation by citizens is required—and whereby citizens' participation is carried out in a cooperative manner based on trust.

Among the above-mentioned discussions, the most important point in terms of this paper's scope of interest is that "citizens and administration cooperate based on trust" in the case of authentic participation<sup>4)</sup>. This means that trust grows through participation and citizens participate because they have trust. In other words, there is a link with "those who try to participate in administration have strong trust in administration." This paper, which focuses on the intent to participate, seeks to identify the relationship between the intent to participate and trust in administration. It also seeks to verify whether or not those who have the intent to participate have a high probability of trusting in administration, even when other major variables which affect trust, such as the quality of administrative services and expectations, are controlled.

What characterizes "those who have an intent to participate?" Those who actually participate in

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<sup>4)</sup> Trust behind participation includes both aspects of the citizens' trust in administration and the administration's trust in citizens. This paper covers the citizens' trust in administration, while the administration's trust in citizens is verified in K. Yang (2005) described below.

administration are stochastically selected according to costs associated with participation and opportunities, from those who have intent to participate, regardless of whether their intention is overt or covert; it is natural to think that those who have intent to participate are more likely to actually participate than those who do not. Therefore, a certain ratio of those who have intent to participate (probably a very small ratio) includes most of those who actually do take participative action, while the remaining ratio includes those who have intent but do not actually participate. “Those who have the intent but do not take participative action” here are a number of silent citizens worth noticing. Most silent citizens do not think that they want to participate in all activities, such as administrative activities and city planning. A common tendency of silent citizens seems to be that they become silent by avoiding costs of participating in all activities. While this does not mean they do not want to participate at all, they want to participate in only what interests them. If so, then it is necessary to include those who partially participate in administration among “those who have the intent to participate.” Therefore, in examining the relationship between the intention to participate and trust in administration, it is necessary to divide “those who have the intent to participate” into one group that includes those who wish to partially participate in administration and the other that does not include them. Then there is a need to confirm the significance of the relationship between a group of “those who have the intent to participate” that includes those who wish to partially participate in administration, and the trust in administration.

### 2.3. Administration as a Central Agent of Governance and Trust

In recent years, it has been recognized that administration is not just an agent that is responsible for public policy, and discussions associated with trust in administration relate to the issue of how to manage the various networks linking the entities related to public policy. This is because it can be considered that the capacity to respond to public issues (social capacity) increases as a result of activities by various entities through management of networks (Murakami, 2007: Chap1). Trust in administration includes an aspect that people have trust in how administration manages each network, deciding whether or not it should be utilized based on trust in administration. In this case, it can be said that efficiency can be assured, though there is an element of uncertainty according to the above-mentioned argument by Yamagishi.

Mayama argues that governance is an activity to construct, maintain and manage networks related to the government, enterprises, NPOs and NGOs for solving various issues existing in public space (Mayama, 2002: 100). The search for trust in administration also means paying attention to trust, a condition of governance. When this trust is applied to administration, administration is expected to be a central agent for managing public policy. Unlike expectations to the above-mentioned administrative services, in this section we focus on the expectations of administration as a central agent of governance from a broader viewpoint.

A research project on the role of new governance by academic researchers at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and others —represented by Joseph Nye— deliberates a hypothesis of the reason why trust in the government has decreased. Although decisive factors have not been identified, they pointed out, those for the case in the United States, as follows: expectations based on the illusion of what the government can do, changes in the role of media which shapes people’s recognition, the spread of values based on libertarianism and post-materialism which doubt authority, and the political process which has caused a estrangement between political elites and the general public (Joseph Nye, et al., 2002:361-374). Among those factors, the first-mentioned “expectations based on the illusion of what the government can do” is a point of debate related to the government’s territory. Jane Mansbridge, a member

of the research team, claims that the most part of the reasons why the U.S. Government lost trust is derived indirectly from the amount of activity over the government's territory (overload). This overload means that the government started cutting down on expenses for solving problems based on new socio-cultural issues, growing expectations and limited resources (Joseph Nye, et al., 2002: 209, 361-374).

Overload is said to occur if expectations of administration are higher than an appropriate level. When the quality of administrative services is judged in relation to such overestimated expectations, their evaluation drops, as mentioned previously. Paradoxically, administration is expected to be a central agent of management of all networks.

This also seems to apply to Japan. According to data from a survey on the role of administration conducted by the Institute of Administrative Management (albeit from the 1980's), it is revealed that a large percentage of the Japanese public expected administration to play an active role such as "actively doing what is beneficial for the entire society," but not as a role to support parliament (Kikuchi, 2006: 25-26). Moreover, although he notes the importance of measures such as citizens' participation and policy evaluation, Niikawa points out that because citizens have limited opportunities to participate in the measures, it may be difficult to attain trust, except for when the government exercises the original administrative functions such as attempts to improve and maintain the quality of administrative services (Niikawa, 2006: 27-28). Alternatively, although Mayama mentions that situations where the third sector takes responsibility will increase in "management of networks by various agents"—an area in which the government sector has played a central role in the past—he points out that the government sector will continue to play a relatively prominent role, because the government has many resources amongst its networks (Mayama, 108, 111). In fact, citizens expect administration to play just such a role, and it may be difficult to look for the role of central agents at any other than administration.

This paper verifies these ideas, taking into account the relationship between expectations of administration as a central agent of governance and trust in administration, while assuming that expectations of administration are still high even in the current situation—whereby governance draws attention and people have started to notice the existence of various agents that take responsibility for public services.

### 3. Empirical Study Concerning Trust in Administration and Citizens' Participation

What kind of empirical studies have been conducted concerning trust in administration and citizens' participation? As an empirical study which uses trust as a variable, there is a study incorporating the EVLN (exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect) model, which includes loyalty representing trust in the government, in an estimation equation as part of research on the satisfaction level in a broader sense (W.E. Lyons, D. Lowery and R.H. DeHoog, 1992: Chap3-4, G.G. Van Ryzin, 2004a, 2004b). However, although this research argues whether the citizens become to trust in the government as they are satisfied with the government or they exit to other areas, the main focus is which factors affect the satisfaction level, and so trust itself is not the center of the research project.

On the other hand, there have already been a certain number of empirical studies which set trust as a major arguing point and attempt to verify its factors in politics and the social capital theory. For example, there are studies such as the one by T. Christensen and P. Laegreid (2005) that verified that politico-cultural variables—including the satisfaction level for functions of the democratic system, the importance of politics in life, and political interest—have

an effect on trust in the Norwegian government. There is also the notable study by V.A. Chanley et al. (2000) that creatively used time-series analysis to prove that crime, expectations of the economy, and scandals in Congress etc. have an effect on trust in the U.S. government.

However, there do not seem to be so many studies that verify trust by means of multivariables, focusing on trust between administration and citizens as well as citizens' participation itself, other than those by K. Yang (2005), E.M. Berman (1997), and X. Wang and M. Van Wart (2007). Among these, K. Yang's empirical study (2005) discusses the relationship between administrative officials' trust in citizens and citizens' participation, which is therefore not directly related to the focus of this paper. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, authentic participation functions with trust of administration in citizens. Results of the relevant studies show that although administrative officers' trust in citizens fosters citizens' participation (citizens' participation is fostered by administrative officers), the procedure-orientation of administrative organizations and criticism of administration results in a decrease in trust and can be an impediment to citizens' participation.

Moreover, a study by E.M. Berman (1997) carries out logit analysis, with cynicism as a dependent variable for one analysis in exploring various discussions on the cynicism of citizens toward the government, and with strategy, economic conditions, social circumstances, and regions as independent variables. Among the independent variables, strategy is one variable which shows the number of initiatives for information strategy (transmission of information to citizens on policy, system and taxes), participation strategy (citizens' participation in public hearings and citizens' conferences) and for trust strategy (control of reputation through campaigns for improving the image of the government and giving award). This study verifies that the greater the number of these strategies, the less cynicism is likely to exist. However, citizens' participation is only dealt with as part of these strategies.

Meanwhile, X. Wang and M. Van Wart (2007) argue the link between citizens' trust in administration and citizens' participation, and although their paper does not mention trust in administration in relation to citizens' intent to participate, it has a lot in common with the focus of this paper. X. Wang and M. Van Wart (2007) carry out path analysis of the structure that public participation has an effect on each administrative activity, which in turn that has an effect on public trust. This is assuming that administrative activities such as public consensus formation, ethical behavior, accountability, capacity to respond to services, and management capability are part of the relationship between public participation and public trust. The data (from 2000) comes from the recognition of administrative staff, such as city managers, their assistants, and financial officers in U.S. city governments with populations over 50,000 in the United States (cities which belong to the ICMA: International City/County Management Association).

First of all, participation is indexed from three viewpoints: type of participation, participation in each function, and participation in decision-making. These three viewpoints are further segmented: For "type of participation," focus is placed on whether public hearings, community meetings, citizens' advisory boards, the Internet, and citizen's conferences are used. For "participation in each function," focus is placed on whether public involvement is conducted within each service sector, such as zoning and planning, parks and recreation, police and security, as well as in each management of each resource, such as budget, staff and procurement. Finally, for "participation in decision-making," focus is placed on whether public involvement is conducted in each area such as confirmation of goals for departments and programs, development of strategies for achieving these goals, development of policies and alternative measures, and evaluation of results of policies and measures. Each breakdown, from "type of participation" to "participation in decision-making," is evaluated on a five-grade scale: "Strongly agree," "Agree," "Neutral"

“Disagree” and “Strongly disagree.” Results are added up and the single aggregated indicator on five-grade scale is regarded as an indicator of participation.

Secondly, trust is assessed in five grades in the same manner and is aggregated to one indicator. Trust in city governments is indexed from the viewpoints of three parties: citizens, elected council members/officials, and private companies/NPOs. From the citizens' viewpoint, assessment is made in five grades concerning such points as whether “I can trust the city government,” “the city government implements commitments,” “the city government treats citizens fairly,” and “the city government has the capacity to respond to citizens' needs.” From the viewpoint of elected council members/officials, assessment is made in five grades regarding such points as whether “they trust in administration,” “administration honors its commitments to the public,” “administration is an efficient and effective organization,” and “administration has the capacity to respond to citizens' needs.” From the viewpoint of private companies/NPOs, assessment is made in five grades regarding such points as whether “they trust in administration,” “administration is an efficient and effective organization,” and “administration has the capacity to respond to citizens' needs.” All these assessment are added up and processed to get one trust indicator.

As for consensus formation, assessment is made in five grades from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”, concerning whether citizens reached consensus on each aspect, such as purpose and target of service delivery, priority of service, and performance of services, and this is added up to get one indicator. For other indicators, each assessment is also made in five grades on certain aspects and is added up as one indicator. Ethical behaviors deal with leadership in moral aspects, sincerity of individual civil servants, and abilities of administrative organizations concerning ethical behaviors. As for accountability, finance, performance of services, and availability of information provision on rules, regulations and enforcement to the parties concerned are indexed. Capacity to respond to services is indexed based on such aspects as understanding of public needs, service provision in line with needs, whether it is possible to meet needs, and whether citizens are highly satisfied. Finally, management capacity is indexed based on effectiveness and use of the information system concerning management and availability of capacities for cost accounting, financial analysis, and analysis on operations and staff.

Thus, path analysis is carried out via the indexed variables. As a result, while it becomes clear that consensus formation, accountability and management capacity are not significant variables which intermediate participation and trust and that no relationships are found, it has been proven that ethical behaviors and capacity to respond to services are significantly positive. In other words, consensus formation and accountability do not contribute to enhancement of trust by themselves. On the other hand, it is pointed out that trust is enhanced both if civil servants are sincere and exercise leadership in an ethical manner, and if appreciation for ethics is incorporated into the government as a system through the process of participation in administration. Moreover, as for capacity to respond to services, it is pointed out that the process of participation—which creates needs— leads to improvement of public services and enhances trust in the government if the government creates high quality services in response to needs.

However, there are still some questions about the methodology X. Wang and M. Van Wart (2007) used. For example, as mentioned in the last part of their paper, a data creation method based on research data aimed at administrative staff shows a decisively important limit. Moreover, there is room for discussion on methodology used: for example, a method that adds up items having different characters from “type of participation” to “participation in decision-making” and converts the results to the degree of participation, or a method whereby trust is evaluated by adding up some items based on viewpoints of citizens, administrative staff, private enterprises, and NPOs, etc. and not

the general public.

An empirical study by X. Wang and M. Van Wart (2007) is intended for participative actions and is used only as reference in this paper. Nevertheless, it proves a decisively important point of debate: Specifically, capacity to respond to services has a significant effect on trust in administration, while administrative services formed by this capacity to respond is assessed as the quality of administrative services when delivered to citizens. A variable that shows capacity to respond may be inserted in the estimation equation to be verified below. However, the importance of the quality of administrative services was pointed out above, and logically speaking, they have a high correlation with the variable so it cannot be included in the same estimation equation. Therefore, the focus is placed on proving whether the relationship between trust and the quality of administrative services which have already been noted as important is significantly positive.

#### 4. Verification of “Trust in Administration and Citizens’ Intent to Participate” in Japan

Based on some points of discussions concerning “trust in administration and citizens’ intent to participate,” as well as previous empirical studies, an empirical verification is carried out on the relationship between trust in administration and citizens’ intent to participate in Japan. To be specific, logit analysis is carried out using trust in administration as a dependent variable, intention to participate as an independent variable, and other related independent variables are set.

Data was collected via a survey covering 300 people, 150 from Osaka and 150 from Kobe, through a private web research company<sup>5)</sup>. Specific questions are described in the Appendix.

##### 4.1. Setting of Variables

In previous empirical studies, trust in administration was set including the viewpoints not only of citizens but also of NPO and companies. However, the citizens’ trust in administration is of primary importance in this paper. Choices for citizens’ trust in administration are: “1. Very little trust” “2. Not much trust” “3. Neutral” “4. Some trust” and “5. A lot of trust.” After this, choices 4 and 5 were converted into “Trust: 1” and the others into “No trust: 0” as in two values.

As discussed in the section about “intent to participate and strong trust,” the main purpose of this paper is to verify whether those who have intent to participate show a high probability of trusting in administration, even when variables such as the quality of administrative services and expectations are controlled. An implication from the discussion on authentic participation and unauthentic participation was a correlation that those who have intent to participate are those with stronger trust in administration.

Those who do not participate in order to avoid costs associated with participation sit on the sidelines compared to those who participate. Most of “those who avoid costs associated with participation” say that they do have the intention when they are asked whether they have intent to participate. However, they do not want to participate in all

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<sup>5)</sup> This research was conducted by Yahoo Japan Value Insight Corporation in July 2007. Ages of the sample participants are as follows: twenties: 20%, thirties to forties: 40%, over fifties: 40%, while male-female ratio is approximately 50:50.

activities but intend to participate only in limited activities in which they are interested. It has been discussed previously that citizens who seek limited participation are the numerous silent citizens.

Based on this discussion, the following options of the participating intention were given: "1. I want to participate in administration very actively," "2. I want to participate as much as I can," "3. I want to participate only in what interests me," "4. I am reluctant to participate" and "5. I do not want to participate at all." Analysis was carried out by using the following two case scenarios: "Case 1" (including limited participation) whereby those who choose 1 to 3 are regarded as having an intent to participate, while the rest do not. "Case 2" (excluding limited participation) whereby those who choose 1 and 2 are regarded as having an intent to participate, while the rest do not. The expected result is: For Case 1, limited participation is regarded as "having intent to participate," is significant. For Case 2, limited participation is included in "those who do not have an intent to participate," is not significant. It is thought that "an intent to participate" and "strong trust" are not interrelated until we include not only categories for people who actively participate in administration, but also categories for those with limited participation (as chosen by a number of silent citizens).

Next, for the quality of administrative services and expectations, a seven-grade scale was presented regarding the quality of administrative services in comparison with expectations, ranging from "Actual quality is much higher than my expectations" to "Actual quality is much lower than my expectations." These were converted into dummy variables so that "much higher," "higher," and "slightly higher" are regarded as one (high), and the other options were regarded as zero. An anticipated hypothesis is that if the quality of administrative services is higher than expectations, then there is a greater possibility that citizens' trust in administration is also higher.

Moreover, as many people expect administration to play an active role in governing in Japan, a question was asked regarding the central agent of governance, and a dummy variable was set with the answer of "administration" as one. The point of debate here is that governance manages a variety of networks so that trust is important as one of its conditions. Thus, an anticipated hypothesis is that the fact that people entrust such management to administration means they have trust in administration; therefore, those who answer that a central agent of governance is "administration" have a higher possibility of trusting in administration compared to those who do not give this answer.

As other independent variables, the intent of which location to settle (live) seems to be related to trust in administration<sup>6)</sup>. A dummy variable was given with these options: "I want to continue to live here forever" and "I want to continue to live here if possible" as 1, and options "Neutral," "I want to move in the future" and "I want to move as soon as possible" as 0. An anticipated hypothesis is that "those who have an intention of settling in the current location have a higher possibility of trusting in administration."

In order to ensure administrative transparency, promotion of citizens' participation, as well as how to provide administrative information—such as the way in which administrative activities are conveyed to citizens—are important. A variable which indicates proximity of the distance from administration to citizens was set as a way for providing administrative information. Among the options for "methods for supplying information" shown in the Appendix, the proximity of information provision by websites and public relations magazines are thought to be "distant," and by public meetings and symposiums as "close." A dummy variable was set with "close (choices 3 and 4)"

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<sup>6)</sup> Initial settlement intention was set as an independent variable—considered as a variable that has an effect on trust in administration. However, settlement intention is a variable affected by the quality of administrative services, and independent variables may be interrelated. Therefore, correlation of both variables was taken, but the correlation function was 0.08, and a result of an uncorrelated test showed that there was no correlation. Analysis excluding settlement intention was also conducted, and the results showed little difference from the one analyzed with settlement intention included.

as one in the analysis. There are two anticipated hypotheses: One is that citizens who want a close proximity for information provision have strong trust in administration and are very interested in what it does. The other is that citizens who want a close proximity for information provision are critical of administration on a regular basis and want some discussion due to their distrust.

The following socioeconomic variables were set: age (the dummy for each age group over thirties, while twenties is a reference category); sex (dummy to be males); place of residence (dummy for a resident of Osaka); annual income (dummy for every 2 million yen from 2 million yen to 12 million yen, with under 2 million yen as a reference category). They are variables to control the difference for trust in administration according to age, sex, regionality and income.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

|  | Number of answers | Average value | Standard deviation | Maximum value | Minimum value |
|--|-------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Trust in administration  | 300               | 0.287         | 0.452              | 1             | 0             |
| Intent to participate of citizens (including limited participation)          | 300               | 0.737         | 0.440              | 1             | 0             |
| Intent to participate of citizens (excluding limited participation)          | 300               | 0.180         | 0.384              | 1             | 0             |
| Quality of administrative services in comparison with expectations           | 300               | 0.043         | 0.204              | 1             | 0             |
| Intent to settle in current location   | 300               | 0.637         | 0.481              | 1             | 0             |
| Dummy which recognizes the central agent of governance as administration     | 300               | 0.303         | 0.460              | 1             | 0             |
| Dummy of information provision distance (in the case that distance is close) | 300               | 0.137         | 0.343              | 1             | 0             |
| Attributes   |                   |               |                    |               |               |
| Twenties age group dummy   | 300               | 0.200         | 0.400              | 1             | 0             |
| Thirties age group dummy   | 300               | 0.283         | 0.451              | 1             | 0             |
| Forties age group dummy  | 300               | 0.117         | 0.321              | 1             | 0             |
| Over fifty age group dummy   | 300               | 0.400         | 0.490              | 1             | 0             |
| Male dummy   | 300               | 0.480         | 0.500              | 1             | 0             |
| Residence in Osaka dummy   | 300               | 0.500         | 0.500              | 1             | 0             |
| Income under 2 million yen dummy   | 300               | 0.080         | 0.271              | 1             | 0             |
| Income over 2 million yen and under 4 million yen dummy                      | 300               | 0.253         | 0.435              | 1             | 0             |
| Income over 4 million yen and under 6 million yen dummy                      | 300               | 0.277         | 0.447              | 1             | 0             |
| Income over 6 million yen and under 8 million yen dummy                      | 300               | 0.140         | 0.347              | 1             | 0             |
| Income over 8 million yen and under 10 million yen dummy                     | 300               | 0.113         | 0.317              | 1             | 0             |
| Income over 10 million yen and under 12 million yen dummy                    | 300               | 0.070         | 0.255              | 1             | 0             |
| Income over 12 million yen dummy   | 300               | 0.067         | 0.249              | 1             | 0             |


Note: The total of average value becomes 1 in the case of age and income. (The average value of each age group and income group is the composition ratio.)

#### 4.2. Distribution of the "Citizens' Intent to Participate in Administration" and "Trust in Administration"

First of all, let us briefly examine the situations with citizens' participation and trust. For intent to participate, only 2.7% of subjects answered, "I want to participate very actively in administration." While 15.3% of subjects answered, "I want to participate in administration as much as I can," more than half (55.7%) of them answered, "I want to participate only in what interests me," giving this choice the highest rate. Over 20% of subjects answered, "I am reluctant to participate."

For trust in administrative agents such as the cities of Osaka and Kobe, the ratio of those who answered "A lot of trust" was less than 1%. Thus, almost 30% of subjects answered that they have trust when the "A lot of trust" group is combined with those who answered, "Some trust" (28%). When totaling those who answered, "Not much trust (29%)" or "Very little trust (10.3%)," 40% of the subjects do not have trust in administration. The remaining 30% answered "Neutral." The ratio of those who do not have trust is higher than that of those who have trust. How can this be understood in relation to the intent to participate?

Figure 1: Citizens' intent to participate and trust in administration (cities of Osaka and Kobe)



Secondly, results of a cross-table of the level of trust in administration by intent to participate are shown in Table 2. Case 1, where choices 1 to 3 of intent to participate in administration in the area a) are read as a choice "I want to participate" is as in b), and case 2 where only choices 1 and 2 are read as a choice "I want to participate" is as in c). As mentioned above, the difference between Case 1 and Case 2 is whether limited participation (those who want to participate only in what interests them) should be included in "I want to participate." Based on the results of cross-table, among those who want to participate in administration there seems to be a general tendency for a) that the ratio of answerers for the "Trust in administration" category is high, while the ratio of answerers for "Do not have trust in administration" category was low; however, this is not certain. When Case 1 and Case 2 are compared, Case 1 (which includes limited participation) showed a greater difference between the "I want to participate" and "I do not want to participate" categories.

Is it possible to verify this difference statistically? The relationship between the intent to participate and trust is verified by means of logit analysis in the following section.

**Table 2: Trust in Administration by Intent to Participate (cross-table)**

| a)   |               |                              |             |                                     |
|--|---------------|------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------------|
|  | Total         | Have trust in administration | Neutral     | Do not have trust in administration |
| Total  | 300<br>100.0% | 86<br>28.7%                  | 96<br>32.0% | 118<br>39.3%                        |
| 1. I want to participate very actively             | 8<br>100.0%   | 2<br>25.0%                   | 2<br>25.0%  | 4<br>50.0%                          |
| 2. I want to participate as much as I can          | 46<br>100.0%  | 16<br>34.8%                  | 15<br>32.6% | 15<br>32.6%                         |
| 3. I want to participate only in what interests me | 167<br>100.0% | 56<br>33.5%                  | 50<br>29.9% | 61<br>36.5%                         |
| 4. I am reluctant to participate                   | 65<br>100.0%  | 10<br>15.4%                  | 25<br>38.5% | 30<br>46.2%                         |
| 5. I do not want to participate at all             | 14<br>100.0%  | 2<br>14.3%                   | 4<br>28.6%  | 8<br>57.1%                          |
| b) Case 1 (including limited participation)        |               |                              |             |                                     |
|  | Total         | Have trust in administration | Neutral     | Do not have trust in administration |
| I want to participate (1.+2.+3.)                   | 221<br>100.0% | 74<br>33.5%                  | 67<br>30.3% | 80<br>36.2%                         |
| I do not want to participate (4.+5.)               | 79<br>100.0%  | 12<br>15.2%                  | 29<br>36.7% | 38<br>48.1%                         |
| c) Case 2 (not including limited participation)    |               |                              |             |                                     |
|  | Total         | Have trust in administration | Neutral     | Do not have trust in administration |
| I want to participate (1.+2.)                      | 54<br>100.0%  | 18<br>33.3%                  | 17<br>31.5% | 19<br>35.2%                         |
| I do not want to participate (3.+4.+5.)            | 246<br>100.0% | 68<br>27.6%                  | 79<br>32.1% | 99<br>40.2%                         |

Note: "Have trust" is the total of "A lot of trust" and "Some trust," and "Do not have trust" is the total of "Not much trust" and "Little trust."

**4.3. Verification of the Relationship between "Trust in Administration" and "Citizens' Intent to Participate"**

Logit analysis was carried out using trust in administration as a dependent variable, while the intent to participate, the quality of administrative services in comparison with expectations, the intent to settle (in the current location), the administrative dummy as a central agent of governance, etc., were used as independent variable.

Figure 3 shows the results of binomial logit analysis. The intent to participate was significantly positive in Case 1, and those who have such intent show a 2.5 higher possibility of trusting in administration than those who do not in terms of the odds ratio. As expected, Case 2 was not significant, and limited participation ("I want to participate only in what interests me") is included in "Intent to participate" so that it has become clear for the first time that intent to

participate and a high level of trust in administration can be correlated<sup>7)</sup>.

The quality of administrative services in comparison with expectations was significantly positive, as anticipated. If the quality of administrative services is judged to be good by those who do not have unreasonably high expectation standard, it leads to trust in administration. This means that it is 5.2 times (5.4 times in Case 2) as high as those who do not judge the quality of administrative services to be good in Case 1. Those who do not judge the quality of administrative services to be good include people who have unreasonable expectations of administration. In this sense, the adequacy of expectations of administration is a highly important variable in enhancing trust in administration. Moreover, the intent to settle (in the current location) was significantly positive, as anticipated. The odds ratio was 4.2 in Case 1 (4.6 in Case 2).

How about the central agent of governance? One hypothesis—that those who consider administration as a central agent of governance have a higher possibility of trusting in administration than those who do not—was not verified. This means that no difference was found between those who consider administration as a central agent of governance and those who do not; it means that those who have trust in administration and those who do not are distributed fairly evenly among those who consider administration as a central agent of governance. Those who answered administration as a central agent marked the highest percentage—91 out of 300 answers (30.3%). This result reveals that although a relatively large number of citizens consider administration to be a central agent of governance, they do not always have trust in administration.

As for the information provision distance dummy (in the case that the distance is close), it was significant at the 10% standard in Case 1, and the sign was negative. Moreover, around 40% of those who do not prefer methods of information provision that are close to them have trust in administration. However, it was not significant at the 10% level in case 2. This indicates that more of those who demand regular information provision and discussion from community-based administration staff currently have less trust in administration. Although the result supports an anticipated hypothesis that citizens who are critical of administration staff would demand discussion from them, it is not convincing. Paradoxically speaking, however, it is necessary for administrative staff to approach local citizens and raise trust in administration by repeatedly holding discussions with these critical citizens<sup>8)</sup>.

As for attributes, age, sex and income were not significant, and only the residence dummy (Osaka) was significantly negative. This indicates that citizens of Osaka who were chosen for the survey do not have trust in administration when compared to those in Kobe. The chance of citizens in Osaka having trust in administration was only 47% in Case 1 (46% in the Case 2) compared to citizens in Kobe.

As reference, ordered logit analysis was also carried out by assigning dependent variables as follows: “A lot of trust” 5, “Some trust” 4, “Neutral” 3, “Not much trust” 2, and “Very little trust” 1. The results are shown in Table 4. Although there is the problem that part of the thresholds are not significant, the intent to participate intention was significantly positive in Case 1, but not in Case 2. It is also shown that the trends for other independent variables are similar to binomial logit.

<sup>7)</sup> Estimation was also made with only limited participation as 1, and others as 0, and with the same independent variables and dependent variables for the rest, excluding “I want to participate very actively” and “I want to participate as much as I can.” However, limited participation was not significant. Therefore, it is interpreted that it was not significant because “I want to participate very actively” and “I want to participate as much as I can” were categorized as “No intent to participate.” The intent to participate becomes significant only when “I want to participate very actively,” “I want to participate as much as I can,” and limited participation are all 1, and others are 0.

<sup>8)</sup> My paper (2007) indicates that there is no correlation between awareness on the content of administrative services and the difference between the quality of administrative services and expectations. It is necessary to try to foster trust by promoting discussion with citizens (especially with those who are critical of administration) regardless of whether citizens are aware of the content of administrative services.

Table 3: Results of Binomial Logit Analysis

|                       |   | Case 1(including limited participation)                   |                |                          |           | Case 2(not including limited participation) |                |                          |           |       |
|-----------------------|---|---|----------------|--------------------------|-----------|---|----------------|--------------------------|-----------|-------|
|                       |   | Coefficient (B)   | Standard error | Significance probability | Exp (B)   | Coefficient (B)                             | Standard error | Significance probability | Exp (B)   |       |
| Dependent variable    | Trust in administration   |   |                |                          |           |   |                |                          |           |       |
| Independent variables | Citizens' intent to participate   | 0.921   | 0.380          | 0.015 **                 | 2.512     | 0.262                                       | 0.377          | 0.487                    | 1.300     |       |
|                       | Quality of administrative services in comparison with expectations            | 1.649   | 0.656          | 0.012 **                 | 5.201     | 1.694                                       | 0.658          | 0.010 ***                | 5.443     |       |
|                       | Intent to settle (in the current location)                                    | 1.445   | 0.363          | 0.000 ***                | 4.243     | 1.524                                       | 0.359          | 0.000 ***                | 4.593     |       |
|                       | Dummy which recognizes the central agent of governance as administration      | 0.038   | 0.313          | 0.902                    | 1.039     | -0.026                                      | 0.311          | 0.934                    | 0.975     |       |
|                       | Dummy of information provision distance (in the case that distance is closer) | -0.857  | 0.466          | 0.066 *                  | 0.424     | -0.735                                      | 0.464          | 0.113                    | 0.480     |       |
|                       | Attributes  |   |                |                          |           |   |                |                          |           |       |
|                       |   | Thirties age group dummy                                  | 0.734          | 0.449                    | 0.102     | 2.084                                       | 0.730          | 0.446                    | 0.101     | 2.075 |
|                       |   | Forties age group dummy                                   | 0.741          | 0.548                    | 0.176     | 2.098                                       | 0.783          | 0.547                    | 0.152     | 2.188 |
|                       |   | Over fifty age group dummy                                | 0.292          | 0.435                    | 0.502     | 1.339                                       | 0.322          | 0.431                    | 0.455     | 1.380 |
|                       |   | Male dummy  | 0.050          | 0.303                    | 0.869     | 1.051                                       | 0.010          | 0.300                    | 0.972     | 1.011 |
|                       |   | Residence in Osaka dummy                                  | -0.751         | 0.291                    | 0.010 *** | 0.472                                       | -0.774         | 0.288                    | 0.007 *** | 0.461 |
|                       |   | Income over 2 million yen and under 4 million yen dummy   | 0.442          | 0.649                    | 0.496     | 1.556                                       | 0.589          | 0.645                    | 0.361     | 1.801 |
|                       |   | Income over 4 million yen and under 6 million yen dummy   | 0.418          | 0.652                    | 0.521     | 1.519                                       | 0.475          | 0.648                    | 0.464     | 1.608 |
|                       |   | Income over 6 million yen and under 8 million yen dummy   | 0.282          | 0.717                    | 0.694     | 1.326                                       | 0.497          | 0.710                    | 0.484     | 1.644 |
|                       |   | Income over 8 million yen and under 10 million yen dummy  | 0.100          | 0.718                    | 0.889     | 1.105                                       | 0.162          | 0.716                    | 0.821     | 1.176 |
|                       |   | Income over 10 million yen and under 12 million yen dummy | 1.041          | 0.769                    | 0.176     | 2.831                                       | 1.227          | 0.765                    | 0.109     | 3.411 |
|                       |   | Income over 12 million yen dummy                          | 0.150          | 0.784                    | 0.848     | 1.162                                       | 0.308          | 0.783                    | 0.695     | 1.360 |
|                       |   | Constant  | -3.147         | 0.780                    | 0.000 *** | 0.043                                       | -2.634         | 0.728                    | 0.000 *** | 0.072 |
|                       | N   |   |                | 300                      |           |   |                | 300                      |           |       |
|                       | Hit ratio (overall)   |   |                | 74.0                     |           |   |                | 73.0                     |           |       |
| Log likelihood        |   |   | -151.3         |                          |           |   | -154.2         |                          |           |       |
| McFadden R-squared    |   |   | 0.158          |                          |           |   | 0.142          |                          |           |       |

\*: Statistical significance at 10%, \*\*: Statistical significance at 5%, \*\*\*: Statistical significance at 1%

Table 4: Results of Ordered Logit Analysis

|                       |   | Case 1(including limited participation)                   |                |                          | Case 2(not including limited participation) |                |                          |           |
|-----------------------|---|---|----------------|--------------------------|---|----------------|--------------------------|-----------|
|                       |   | Coefficient (B)   | Standard error | Significance probability | Coefficient (B)                             | Standard error | Significance probability |           |
| Dependent variable    | Trust in administration   |   |                |                          |   |                |                          |           |
| Independent variables | Citizens' intent to participate   | 0.505   | 0.257          | 0.050 **                 | 0.153                                       | 0.301          | 0.612                    |           |
|                       | Quality of administrative services in comparison with expectations            | 1.702   | 0.684          | 0.013 **                 | 1.788                                       | 0.697          | 0.010 ***                |           |
|                       | Intent to settle (in the current location)                                    | 1.078   | 0.240          | 0.000 ***                | 1.130                                       | 0.239          | 0.000 ***                |           |
|                       | Dummy which recognizes the central agent of governance as administration      | 0.122   | 0.241          | 0.612                    | 0.108                                       | 0.241          | 0.653                    |           |
|                       | Dummy of information provision distance (in the case that distance is closer) | -0.527  | 0.324          | 0.104                    | -0.436                                      | 0.320          | 0.172                    |           |
|                       | Attributes  |   |                |                          |   |                |                          |           |
|                       |   | Thirties age group dummy                                  | 0.370          | 0.323                    | 0.253                                       | 0.362          | 0.321                    | 0.260     |
|                       |   | Forties age group dummy                                   | 0.197          | 0.422                    | 0.641                                       | 0.252          | 0.419                    | 0.549     |
|                       |   | Over fifty age group dummy                                | 0.279          | 0.311                    | 0.370                                       | 0.284          | 0.310                    | 0.361     |
|                       |   | Male dummy  | -0.234         | 0.230                    | 0.308                                       | -0.248         | 0.232                    | 0.286     |
|                       |   | Residence in Osaka dummy                                  | -0.817         | 0.222                    | 0.000 ***                                   | -0.825         | 0.222                    | 0.000 *** |
|                       |   | Income over 2 million yen and under 4 million yen dummy   | 0.426          | 0.459                    | 0.353                                       | 0.480          | 0.462                    | 0.299     |
|                       |   | Income over 4 million yen and under 6 million yen dummy   | 0.351          | 0.456                    | 0.441                                       | 0.398          | 0.458                    | 0.385     |
|                       |   | Income over 6 million yen and under 8 million yen dummy   | 0.172          | 0.505                    | 0.733                                       | 0.289          | 0.502                    | 0.565     |
|                       |   | Income over 8 million yen and under 10 million yen dummy  | 0.238          | 0.528                    | 0.653                                       | 0.283          | 0.531                    | 0.594     |
|                       |   | Income over 10 million yen and under 12 million yen dummy | 0.963          | 0.599                    | 0.108                                       | 1.061          | 0.596                    | 0.075 *   |
|                       | Income over 12 million yen dummy  | -0.213  | 0.609          | 0.727                    | -0.064                                      | 0.605          | 0.916                    |           |
| Limits Points         | LIMIT_2   | -1.351  | 0.507          | 0.008 ***                | -1.580                                      | 0.495          | 0.001 ***                |           |
|                       | LIMIT_3   | 0.580   | 0.495          | 0.241                    | 0.349                                       | 0.481          | 0.468                    |           |
|                       | LIMIT_4   | 2.170   | 0.507          | 0.000 ***                | 1.922                                       | 0.491          | 0.000 ***                |           |
|                       | LIMIT_5   | 6.548   | 0.875          | 0.000 ***                | 6.289                                       | 0.864          | 0.000 ***                |           |
| N                     |   | 300   |                |                          | 300   |                |                          |           |
| Log likelihood        |   | -370.7  |                |                          | -372.5                                      |                |                          |           |
| McFadden R-squared    |   | 0.083   |                |                          | 0.079                                       |                |                          |           |

\*: Statistical significance at 10%, \*\*: Statistical significance at 5%, \*\*\*: Statistical significance at 1%

## 5. Conclusion

Research was carried out in this paper by constructing an experimental Japanese model based on some points of conjecture concerning trust in administration and citizens' participation, as well as on previous empirical studies. As a result, it was revealed that there is a relationship between those who have intent to participate and those who have trust in administration, when a "limited participation" group (which includes a number of silent citizens who wish to "participate only in what interest me") is regarded as having intent to participate.

Although this study does not deal with the actual behavior of the participants, some very important implications for city development over the future have arisen from the results: i.e. the fact that those who have an intent to participate (including "limited participation") have trust in administration in the current situation, whereby many people do not display participative behaviors, and those who have trust in administration are outnumbered by those who do not. The first implication is that those who have intent to participate have a greater chance of having trust in administration, so that if the administration side can gain trust to citizens, there is a high possibility that authentic participation will be realized. The second implication is that most of those who have intent to participate desire "limited participation". As for ways in which to participate, a more effective idea is that administration presents citizens with various interesting fields and then they choose those fields in which they want to participate, instead of administration developing a system of uniform participation for citizens. This second idea is based on the premise that participation is passive and can be an unauthentic one at the discretion of administration. However, in fact this is the system of participation that most citizens desire. Moreover, it is a fact that taking citizens who want "limited participation" into consideration leads to a more effective participation system compared to the current situation (where a number of unauthentic participation systems coexist in many areas, despite such passive participation). It is also expected that associated continuation of passive participation can create an opportunity that develops into authentic participation.

The quality of administrative services in comparison with expectations is significant. In promoting citizens' participation, it is necessary for administration to improve response by ensuring the quality of services, and to approach communities to hold discussions with citizens —so that citizens do not have unrealistic expectations. This is because those people who are more critical require administration to come to communities for discussion, as highlighted by the relationship between the information provision distance and trust —in which one factor of criticism is unreasonable expectations of administration.

Since many citizens think of administration as a central agent of governance, it is expected that administration will play a central role in managing networks, though the existence of a variety of agents in the public sphere is recognized. Among such citizens, some have trust in administration and others do not. Therefore, there is a need for administration to recognize their role as the central agent of governance more than ever before, and to actively encourage citizens from the administration side. As for discussions on governance, although it seems that the role of administration is relativized within a variety of agents including citizens, has administration been active, leading to authentic participation by citizens so far?

There are some issues of concern, such as the small number of samples used for an empirical verification in this paper, that the area studied is limited to urban areas in the Kansai region, and that important variables affecting trust in administration are not fully examined. In order to enhance the validity of the conclusion in the future, it will be necessary to gather proof while taking these issues into account.

**Appendix: Survey Questions****[Trust in Administration]**

How much trust do you have in the city (administration) where you live now?

1. Very little trust    2. Not much trust    3. Neutral    4. Some trust    5. A lot of trust

**[Citizens' Participation Intention]**

How much would you like to participate in the policy-making process concerning management and planning for the city where you live now?

1. I would like to participate very actively                      2. I would like to participate as much as I can  
3. I would like to participate only in what interests me        4. I am reluctant to participate  
5. I would not like to participate at all

**[Quality of Administrative Services in Comparison with Expectations]**

What do you think of the actual quality of administrative services provided by the city where you live now in comparison with expectations you had? Please answer based on your past experiences. (A question for general services by administration)

1. They are much better than I expected    2. They are better than I expected  
3. They are a little better than I expected    4. They are as I expected  
5. They are a bit worse than I expected    6. They are worse than I expected  
7. They are much worse than I expected

**[Settlement Intention]**

Would you like to continue to live in the city where you live now?

1. I would like to continue to live here forever    2. I would like to continue to live here if possible    3. Neutral  
4. I would like to move in the future                      5. I would like to move as soon as possible

**[Central Agent of Governance]**

There is an idea that public services should be assumed not only by city administration, but also by a variety of agents such as residents, local organizations, and NPOs. Which do you think is the central agent for implementing management of public services?

1. Residents    2. Residents' and neighborhood associations    3. NPOs    4. Enterprises  
5. Administration    6. Other

**[Methods of Providing Information (information provision distance)]**

How do you think city administration should provide information about management and planning of the city where you live now?

1. The city website  
2. Public relations magazine (printed media)  
3. Briefing session for residents by elementary school district  
4. Symposiums held in central facilities such as the city hall  
5. Consultation at the city office window  
6. Such information is not really necessary

**[Age]**

Please indicate your age group

1. Twenties    2. Thirties    3. Forties    4. Fifties

**[Sex]**

Please indicate your sex

1. Male    2. Female

**[Residence]**

Please indicate your city of residence

1. Osaka, Osaka Prefecture    2. Kobe, Hyogo Prefecture

**[Annual Income]**

Please indicate your household's annual income

1. Under 2 million yen    2. Over 2 million yen and under 3 million yen    3. Over 3 million yen and under 4 million yen  
4. Over 4 million yen and under 5 million yen    5. Over 5 million yen and under 6 million yen  
6. Over 6 million yen and under 7 million yen    7. Over 7 million yen and under 8 million yen  
8. Over 8 million yen and under 9 million yen    9. Over 9 million yen and under 10 million yen  
10. Over 10 million yen and under 12 million yen    11. Over 12 million yen and under 15 million yen  
12. Over 15 million yen

Note: Single Answer requested.

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